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ABSTRACT 
 
Sylvia Kocięda: The Rational Soul As The Cause of Unification In The Tripartite Soul 
(Under the direction of C.D.C Reeve) 
 
Discussions regarding unity in the Platonic tripartite soul generally surround the issue of 
achieving virtue.  However, there must exist some type of fundamental, unearned unity between 
the parts of the soul prior to achieving virtue which affords the agent meaningful interactions 
between the three soul-parts and the unity of consciousness.  In this paper, I argue that the 
possession of the rational soul warrants unification of the pre-virtuous soul since the function of 
reason is precisely to be responsible for the organization and intelligibility of parts.  In view of 
this, I suggest that the rational soul itself is the basis for the unearned unity of the soul.  My view 
is developed against the standing view by Eric Brown in which unearned unification is achieved 
by the causal relationship between the three soul-parts, which makes the soul-parts tend toward 
agreement.
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Introduction 
Discussions regarding unity in the Platonic tripartite soul generally surround the issue of 
achieving virtue.  According to Plato, becoming a virtuous agent entails organizing the three 
parts of the soul- reason, spirit, and appetite- such that they coexist in harmony by way of a 
specific process; namely, the latter two parts of the soul- spirit and appetite- must agree to be 
ruled by the higher, rational soul.  However, as Eric Brown argues in a recent article, there must 
exist some type of fundamental unity between the parts of the soul prior to achieving virtuous 
harmony, which affords the agent i) meaningful interactions between the three parts of the soul 
and ii) unity of consciousness in the first place.  In other words, one need not be a virtuous agent 
to possess one, complex soul (comprised of three parts) whose experiences occur in a single 
stream of conscious experience.1 It is not as if the three parts of the soul function independently 
of one another with the agent experiencing three separate sites of consciousness.  Rather, the 
parts constitute a “whole soul.” Brown refers to this issue as a “puzzle” regarding the “unearned 
unity of the soul” that arises for Plato, one that has not received sufficient attention in Plato 
scholarship.  According to Brown, this is a significant issue that must be addressed in order to 
better understand Platonic psychology and, more importantly, why it is that the rational soul 
seems to bear the responsibility of vicious actions caused by the other two parts of the soul, 
particularly in the afterlife.   
                                                        
1 Note that Brown does not a supply an answer for how it is that we possess a singular site of 
consciousness. See Brown (1989). In my paper, I will be collapsing the issues of the unearned 
unity of the parts and the unification of consciousness into one issue. 
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 In this paper, I question whether the issue of the unearned unity of the soul is, in fact, a 
puzzle with which Plato must contend, as Brown presumes.  I argue that Plato explicitly holds 
that the possession of the rational soul warrants unification of the pre-virtuous soul since the 
function of reason is precisely to be responsible for the organization –and intelligibility- of parts. 
In other words, the rational soul operates to bring about order and its mere presence in the human 
(and animal) soul guarantees meaningful interaction among parts and a singular conscious 
experience.  In fact, theoretically, virtuous harmony could not be achieved if the rational soul 
failed to possess this capacity.  In view of this, I suggest that the rational soul itself is the basis 
for the fundamental unity of the complex soul, even prior to acquiring virtue.  While virtue relies 
on the stability of the right proportion of forces between the soul parts as delegated by reason (or 
harmony), mere unity itself simply relies on the presence of the rational soul. 
 To argue for this view, I first cover what Brown perceives to be the puzzle of unearned 
unity in the soul and its implications for moral responsibility, and I briefly cover his suggestion 
to dissolve the puzzle.   Brown relies on two principles he attributes to Plato, the hydraulic and 
hegemonic principles, to highlight a causal relationship between the three soul parts; he believes 
the causal relationship, which makes the soul-parts tend toward agreement, accounts for the unity 
of soul.  In the next section, I raise issues with Brown’s solution, particularly with his construal 
of causation in the soul. I show that such a position is problematic given the ontological priority 
of the rational part in relation to the lower parts of the soul, which undermines its possibility of 
being affected by the lower parts of the soul.  In other words, I argue that, for Plato, the rational 
soul always qualifies as the primary cause and, as such, we must understand any interactions of 
the soul parts as effects of rational activity. I make Plato’s account of vision a central feature of 
the section to highlight the role of the rational soul as the primary cause responsible even for 
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simple sensory experiences (like vision) and I use this example to illustrate the way in which the 
rational soul makes intelligible that which occurs in the other parts of the soul.  According to this 
interpretation, consciousness is afforded only by the activity of the rational part of the soul. Thus, 
there is no problem in accounting for the interaction of the soul parts or the “oneness” of the soul 
since the rational soul is the source of articulation and cognition for these parts and there is no 
problem in accounting for the unity of consciousness since the parts of the soul are not unified to 
make for one consciousness- rather, there is only one site of consciousness to begin with. In the 
end of the section, I follow Brown’s lead by showing how my interpretation bears on the issue of 
moral responsibility of the rational soul. 
Puzzle of the Unearned Unity of the Soul 
 In “The unity of the soul in Plato’s Republic,” Brown seeks to explain how separate 
sources of psychological activity (the three parts of soul) comprise a single, whole soul prior to 
acquiring virtue. This question is pressing in two different respects: first, if unification is a 
feature that is present only in virtuous souls, then Plato “cannot account for the felt unity of 
consciousness.” Agents who lack virtue would simply possess three disparate souls that fail to 
interact in any meaningful way, resulting in something like the possession of three independent 
souls. He notes the many instances in which Socrates refers to both the “plurality and the unity” 
of the human soul, suggesting that Plato certainly emphasizes the fundamental unity of the soul 
prior to virtue, though Socrates never offers an explicit account of how both plurality and unity 
can be the case. But an account is needed to explain what makes “elements into parts of a whole” 
in order to make sense of the complex soul being one soul and to subsequently offer hints as to 
how a single stream of consciousness is made possible despite the plurality of psychological 
sources of activity.  
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Second, the question is pressing because “if Plato cannot explain the unity of the soul, 
then he cannot treat the whole soul as the locus of moral responsibility” (Brown 54).  This is an 
especially important concern since the rational soul bears the effects of the embodied, complex 
soul in the afterlife,2 which affects the mode of reincarnation in the next life, and many times the 
actions of the embodied, complex soul are spurred by desires residing in spirit or appetite, not in 
reason.  Brown holds that “holding the rational part responsible for such actions seems to blame 
an innocent bystander or, worse, a victim.  So it is better to infer from Socrates’ manner of 
speaking that the whole soul is responsible. This can accommodate the hypothesis that only the 
rational part of the soul survives death” (Brown 55).  Thus, an account of what makes the parts 
of soul one complex whole is necessary to understand Plato’s views on moral responsibility. 
Brown looks to Plato’s remarks on other complex wholes to generate a fresh approach to 
unity.3 He appeals to examples that involve ships, speeches and the human body and he does so 
with an eye on establishing the distinction between perfect unity and the minimum amount of 
unity necessary for a thing to qualify as a ship (or speech, body, etc.) in order to establish 
degrees of unification. In looking at these examples, Brown finds that “[something] is made a 
whole by the special arrangement of its parts” and “[in the Gorgias], Socrates maintains that 
every craft, and not just tragedy and oratory, confers special organization on its products. . . and 
he suggests that the same kind of order or organization is manifest in the natural world” (Brown 
66).  For instance, take Plato’s example of a ship.  A certain sort of organization of parts must 
take place for something to qualify as a ship; that is, there is some minimum threshold under 
                                                        
2 Or, at least this is the traditional view. This is a special concern since the state of the soul in the 
afterlife determines the next mode of life in reincarnation.  
 
3 Other approaches looked for unity in the embodiment of soul, which Brown rejects since the 
unity of soul would be based on an extrinsic property. See, Brown, 63ff. 
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which a certain arrangement of parts just simply does not meet the criteria for being a ship.  This 
threshold marks the “suitable” organization of diverse elements “in relation to each other and in 
relation to the whole that they constitute” (Brown 66).  
In addition, the degree of organization and arrangement of the parts track the degree of 
functionality of the entity.  For the ship to qualify as ‘ship’, it must be seaworthy, which entails 
that there must be a suitable organization of its parts such that it can successfully go out to sea.  
If the organization and arrangement of its parts are perfect, then the function of the ship will be 
perfect. On the other hand, if the organization and arrangement of its parts are closer to the lower 
threshold, then the function of the ship will be less than perfect.  If the organization and 
arrangement of its parts are unsuitable, or does not at least meet the lower threshold, it does not 
qualify as a ship.  Likewise, “Socrates assumes both that there is a correlation between 
psychological order (that is, justice) and psychological functioning (that is, living) and that each 
of these features comes in degrees” (Brown 68).  That means that if a soul is to perform its 
function, it requires at least the minimum amount of justice. Brown’s position can be 
summarized with the following passage: 
“The soul’s unity is a function of the order or harmony of its parts.  The parts’ causal 
relations with each other produce this order or harmony:  the more the parts do what they 
are supposed to do, as parts, the more the soul enjoys unity.  On this view, Socrates can 
and does say that the soul’s unity takes the specific form of agreement, since agreement is 
the harmony or order of minded things.  And on this view, the soul can perform vital 
activities- that is, its function of living- with only minimal agreement and order, since it 
requires perfect agreement and order only for excellent or virtuous activities.  (That is the 
distinction between unearned and earned unity)” (Brown 67). 
 
I would like to take the time to examine this passage more fully, as it articulates all of the 
elements of Brown’s view in dissolving the stated puzzle.  The features of his view on which I 
will focus each in turn are i) unification as a function of order or harmony, ii) causal relations 
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between the parts producing order or harmony, and iii) unification as agreement between minded 
things.   
 The first element of Brown’s view- unification as a function of order or harmony- 
specifies the continuum along which increasing degrees of unification indicate “earned” unity, or 
virtue.  That is, at the lower end of the continuum, there exists the minimum amount of order or 
harmony for the three soul-parts to qualify as one, complex soul of an agent.  There has to be at 
least some order, which indicates some unity, if the soul is to be a whole. This minimal structure 
or minimum amount of unity is required simply for living (Brown 70).  At the highest end of the 
continuum, on the other hand, there exists the maximum amount of order or harmony, which is 
required to not simply live, but to live well.  This type of unification of soul-parts is “earned” 
because, unlike the minimal structure of unity that exists naturally in living beings in virtue of 
their merely being alive, the maximum structure of unity is a “perfect fulfillment” of unification- 
i.e., harmony- brought on by the activity and effort of the agent herself.  Thus, for Brown, one 
way to regard the distinction between unearned and earned unity lies in the degree of order with 
the lowest degree of order being naturally constituted (to serve as the animating force of life) and 
increasing degrees of order being arranged by conscious, rational activity.4   
 The second feature of Brown’s view attributes to Plato commitments concerning causal 
relations between the soul-parts.  According to Brown, order or harmony present among soul 
parts to constitute a single, complex whole can be attributed to a particular causal relationship in 
the interaction between soul parts.  On this view, the structural order explored in the prior 
discussion above of the first feature in Brown’s view is produced by causal relations between the 
soul parts and it is this that “makes the three psychological elements parts of a whole” (Brown                                                         
4 Of course, this type of complex soul is to animate complex life. Plants are also alive but possess 
only appetitive souls.  
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68).  Brown spells out two causal principles to make clear these relations (he suggests there are 
probably others, though they are not relevant to the current puzzle): first is “Plato’s hydraulic 
principle of psychology” (Brown 68).  This principle specifies that in cases where one soul-part 
grows stronger the others grow weaker.  He quotes Socrates to support this principle: “When 
someone’s desires incline strongly for one thing, they are thereby weakened for others, just like a 
stream that has been partly diverted into another channel” (Brown 68).  Brown likens this 
“stream” to something like a single “hydraulic power” that operates within the complex soul; 
when one part is amplified, the hydraulic power is funneled in the direction of the desires of that 
part, which causes the other parts to diminish in power.  And he emphasizes that this is indicative 
of one complex soul and that it is indeed unified: “this plainly applies to different soul-parts 
within the same soul.  If my spirited desires grow stronger, my rational and appetitive ones grow 
weaker” (Brown 68).  So, that the causal relations, which spell out the degree of order or 
harmony in the soul, occur only between the soul-parts of this particular agent implies that those 
soul-parts are unified.   
 The second principle is “Plato’s principle of psychological hegemony,” which is closely 
related to the first principle.5 This principle provides an explanation for what it is to be governed 
by a particular soul-part.  As Brown explains it, “to be ruled by a soul-part is to take the ends of 
that soul-part to be one’s ends generally” and he further clarifies that being ruled by a particular 
soul-part is just “explaining what it is for the rational part of the soul to be ruled” (Brown 69).  
Namely, since it is the rational soul-part that measures and calculates, if the appetite rules this 
soul-part, then reason will calculate in terms of how to attain the goods appetite desires (and                                                         
5 “The two causal principles are related.  For instance, a rational part can come to accept that 
honor or victory is what is good only if it is too weak to grasp what really is good, but it will be 
too weak if the spirit has taken much of the soul’s “hydraulic power” away from reason” (Brown 
69). 
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likewise in the case of spirit and the desires spirit wishes to fulfill if spirit rules the rational soul-
part).  In this way, then, “my soul-parts are parts of one psychological system, one soul. They are 
parts of one soul because they are parts of an orderly causal structure” (Brown 70).  
 The final feature of Brown’s position concerns the soul’s unity “tak[ing] the specific 
form of agreement, since agreement is the harmony or order of minded things.” It is this specific 
feature that will lend itself most directly to the issue of the whole soul bearing the responsibility 
of vicious actions incurred during embodiment.  The orderly causal structure present in every 
soul “tends toward agreement,” which, for Brown, is another way to explain how the three soul-
parts constitute one soul (Brown 70).  In the virtuous soul, this “tendency” is fulfilled perfectly:  
all of the soul-parts agree to do exactly what it is that they are supposed to do. In the less than 
virtuous soul and even in corrupt souls, the tendency to agree is present.  In what does this 
“tendency” consist?  Brown clarifies when he notes that the soul “tends to organize and unify 
itself” and that the causal principles discussed above explain how it is that the soul can fulfill this 
tendency.  For instance, there is “a tendency for the rational part to agree with appetite about 
what is good and a tendency for the spirited part to find some honor in what appetite pursues” 
(Brown 70).  Brown clarifies further when he draws our attention to Socrates’ example of a band 
of robbers who would be “unable to achieve an unjust purpose if its members were unjust toward 
one each other” (Brown 68).  So, even in the most corrupt soul, there must be some tendency 
towards agreement between its parts if the agent is to function at all.   
 Due to this final feature of Brown’s view, Brown holds that the interaction between the 
soul-parts mirror a typical account of collective agency and that this explains how the whole, 
complex soul is accountable for actions committed by the agent during embodiment.  If the soul-
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parts are collectively responsible for embodied actions, then the rational part can fairly bear 
responsibility for embodied actions when it enters the afterlife: 
“When one part of the soul does something, the others are causally implicated in a 
structure that fosters agreement.  At the least, each of the others could have been a more 
powerful obstacle.  So it would not be inappropriate to hold the rational part alone 
responsible in the afterlife for what the other parts had done during embodied life” 
(Brown 70). 
 
Brown, then, is able to dissolve the puzzle of the plural but united complex soul and addresses 
the issue of the moral responsibility of the rational soul using the three features of his view, 
especially the third. Nevertheless, he admits that he is not able to provide a satisfactory answer 
for how it is that agents experience a single stream of consciousness given his view. 
 In the next section, I raise serious issues with Brown’s solution to the puzzle of the 
unearned unity in the soul. In doing so, I generate a competing account, which undermines 
Brown’s causal principles. I rely heavily on the Timaeus as it is the most explicit text to engage 
the issue of causation as well as the relationship between the three parts of the soul, though I also 
back up these claims by referring to other texts. In laying out my competing view, I aim to show 
why Brown’s answer to the issue of moral responsibility is highly dissatisfying and I go on to 
offer an answer as to why the rational part is the only part of soul morally responsible for the 
actions of the embodied agent. An additional advantage of my view is that it addresses and 
explains the issue of unity of consciousness.   
The Rational Soul’s Role in Unearned Unification 
  In this section, I attempt to address the issue of unearned unification of the soul-parts by 
appealing to the presence of the rational soul alone.  Before raising issues with the solution 
Brown offers, I first wish to construe crucial passages from the Republic as evidence that Plato 
takes the rational soul to be the principle of fundamental unification between the three soul-parts.  
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I support this construal by briefly illuminating key passages in the Philebus and in the Timaeus, 
both of which highlight the rational soul as being a principle of unification not just in the 
complex, embodied soul, but also between the soul and body.   
Consider Plato’s multiple suggestions that there is something “natural” and “appropriate” 
about allowing the rational soul the function of ruling the complex soul.  For instance, he asks, 
“isn’t it appropriate for the rational part to rule since it is really wise and exercises foresight on 
behalf of the whole soul” (Republic, 441e, my emphasis).6 Shortly following this query, he 
states, “we’ll call him wise because of that small part of himself that rules in him and makes 
those declarations and has within it the knowledge of what is advantageous for each part and for 
the whole soul, which is the community of all three parts” (Rep. 442c, my emphasis).  At 444d, 
Plato emphasizes, after analogizing the just soul to a healthy body, that producing justice is “to 
establish the parts of the soul in a “natural relation of control” while injustice consists in a 
relation of ruling and being ruled that is “contrary to nature.”7 And he describes the guardians 
most fitting to serve as rulers those who have a “conviction” to “pursue what is advantageous to 
the city” (Rep., 412e).  
 I believe the best way to interpret such passages given the issue at hand is to ask why it is 
that the rational part should rule.  Perhaps Plato is merely making the point that in the virtuous 
soul, the rational part just does the job of ruling the whole, complex soul.  But I believe Plato is 
making a larger point in these passages.  It seems that he wants to stress that the rational part is 
the appropriate part of the complex soul to rule precisely because it alone possesses the capacity 
to consider not only the other parts of the complex soul, but also the soul insofar as it is one                                                         
6 All references are from Plato’s “Republic” in Plato: Complete Works (1997) unless otherwise 
noted. See Plato: Complete Works, 971-1223.  
 
7 My emphasis. 
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entity.  Plato suggests acquiring knowledge since the rational part has the ability- if properly 
trained- to determine what is “advantageous” for each part, subsequently determining what is 
best for the whole soul.  Thus, the answer to the question “why is it that Plato proposes the 
rational soul should rule” is simply that the rational part is naturally oriented to account for its 
lower parts as elements of one, complex entity and as such is the only part of the soul capable of 
ruling and qualified to properly rule.   
 The rational soul’s function of unification does not exhaust itself within the soul and its 
parts but extends to the body and its association with the soul as well.  In the Philebus, Socrates 
draws a parallel between the human soul and the cosmic soul by indicating the relationship 
between the material elements of the human and of the world:  “there is something called fire 
that belongs to us, and then again there is fire in the universe” (Philebus, 29b). He explicates the 
relationship between the element of fire that is in the human, which is “small in amount, feeble, 
and poor” and that of the universe which is “overwhelming in size and beauty” as one in which 
the latter sustains the former.  He goes on to apply this example to the human soul.  The human 
body is “obviously” equipped with a human soul and it is to the soul that we owe any training to 
or medicine for the body or order in general. Protarchus, Socrates’ interlocutor, agrees that it 
would be foolish to assume that the human body possesses a soul that imputes to the human 
being intelligence while the cosmic body fails to possess an intelligent soul.  
Moreover, the cosmic soul, like cosmic fire, is overwhelming in its capacity, beauty and 
purity compared to the capacity and impurity of the human soul and, again like cosmic fire, the 
cosmic soul is that from which the human soul is derived and thrives (by reaching virtue).  The 
principle responsible for the integration of the human soul and body, then, is manifested 
perfectly in the source of the cosmic soul and the cosmic body, which even Protrarchus 
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acknowledges as residing in the intelligence of the cosmic soul: “the only account that can do 
justice to the wonderful spectacle presented by the cosmic order of sun, moon, and stars and the 
revolution of the whole heaven, is that reason arranges it all, and I for my part would never fail 
in saying or believing it” (Phil., 28e).8  The integration or unification of the cosmic soul and 
body is found in the cosmic soul ruling and arranging the constituents of the cosmic body. That 
is, the reason for the ordering of elements of the cosmic body is the fundamental principle of 
unification. If we take Socrates’ parallel introduced earlier seriously, then, the integration or 
unification of the human soul and the human body must be found in the rational soul ruling the 
constituents of the human body.  Thus, the reason the human body is ordered the way it is owes 
its arrangement to the rational soul and the rational soul is the principle that supports the 
unification of the body and the soul. 
Plenty of passages from the Timaeus support the idea that the rational part affects the 
arrangement of the human body (including its organs) and the idea that the rational part underlies 
the unification of the body and the soul.  I would like to focus on the latter since that is the 
present, broader claim being made.9 The demiurge, or craftsman responsible for creating the 
universe in the image of a perfect blueprint, is supremely good and intelligent.  The content of 
the blueprint, being perfect, possesses only goodness, which informs the demiurge’s choice to 
infuse in the material world a cosmic soul.  A world with intelligence is better than a world 
without intelligence, but intelligence is hosted only through souls, so in giving the material world                                                         
8 This passage supports the view that only the rational soul can be rightly identified as causing 
order or arrangement. In the case of the universe, this ordering is carried out perfectly due to the 
scope and perfection of the cosmic soul.  In the case of the human being prior to achieving 
virtue, the ordering is carried out imperfectly. I will return to this later in the paper. 
 
9 For example, see 70d-e in which Timaeus describes the organs (in this case, the heart) joining 
the lower soul-parts to serve reason and the following account of the configuration of the liver 
and spleen for the purpose of serving the rational part.  
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a cosmic soul, the demiurge created a “truly living thing, endowed with soul and intelligence” 
(Timaeus, 30c).  With the introduction of soul and consequently intelligence into the material 
world, the demiurge conquered the disorder present in material things: “the [demiurge] wanted 
everything to be good and nothing to be bad so far as that was possible, and so he took over all 
that was visible- not at rest but in discordant and disorderly motion- and brought it from a state 
of disorder to one of order, because he believed that order was in every way better than disorder” 
(Tim., 30a).10  Undoubtedly, the presence of reason achieves and maintains order in the cosmos.  
However, what is less clear is how reason is a principle of unification between the cosmic soul 
and cosmic body. Timaeus spells this out a few lines later at 32c: 
“It isn’t possible to combine two things well all by themselves without a third; there has 
to be some bond between the two that unites them.  Now the best bond is one that really 
and truly makes a unity of itself together with the things bonded by it, and this in the 
nature of things is best accomplished by proportion” (Tim., 32c). 
 
Following this assertion, Timaeus goes on to describe the creation of the remaining two 
elements- earth and water- with which the demiurge creates in order to fashion (along with the 
other two elements of fire and earth) the world of visible things.  Establishing a proportion 
among any parts is described as “bestowing friendship” or “harmony” between parts and so 
unification is “best accomplished” by this.  The unification of the cosmic soul and the cosmic 
body is the act of cosmic soul keeping itself informed of the material parts whose order it 
underlies such that each part is kept in proportion to the others.  The act of being informed and 
subsequently using such information to calculate and maintain proportion, then, is an intelligent 
one and could not be accomplished if the material world were to lack a cosmic soul.                                                           
10 The way I have described the ordering of the material universe reverses the order of the 
narrative as presented in the “Timaeus”.  I do this to preserve the fact that the cosmic soul was 
prior to the creation of the universe: “The [demiurge] gave priority and seniority to the soul, both 
in its coming to be and in the degree of its excellence, to be the body’s mistress and to rule over 
it as her subject (34c).”   
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 At this point, it should be obvious that the path my argument will take assumes that 
unearned unity of soul-parts lies in the rational part’s natural proclivity to oversee all other parts, 
even if its function of overseeing is perpetually confused. That is, the difference between 
unearned unity and earned unity is that in the latter case, virtue, the rational part oversees or 
accounts for all parts with knowledge of what is advantageous to each part, thus enabling a 
successful act of keeping parts in proportion, while in the former case, the rational part lacks this 
knowledge. Briefly returning to the parallel drawn between cosmic material elements and the 
cosmic soul with respect to material elements in the human body and the human soul in the 
Philebus, one can see that the act of keeping parts in proportion in the cosmic soul can never be 
confused due to the overwhelming scope and perfection of the cosmic soul.11  In comparison, the 
human rational soul is less pure, feeble and lacks perfection.  But appealing to the given passages 
above will not alone make this case and so I will now turn back to Brown’s account and what I 
see to be its problems in order to generate a stronger and more well supported argument for my 
speculation. 
 Recall from the prior section the latter two features of Brown’s solution to the issue of 
unearned unity.  The second feature dealt with the two causal principles- the hydraulic principle 
and the hegemonic principle- that produce order or harmony in the soul (feature one) while the 
third feature read unity itself to be a form of agreement between “minded things.” It seems, on 
the one hand, to construe the “relations” between the soul-parts as equivalent “causal” relations 
and, on the other hand, to assume that lower soul is “minded” such that Plato is referring to an 
actual, robust agreement between soul-parts flies in the face of Plato’s thoughts expressed in his 
                                                        
11 However, this does not ensure perfect functioning of the universe since necessity operates in 
the background. I will return to the issue of necessity when it is not driven by intelligence 
shortly. 
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theory of causation.  In order to cash out Plato’s view of causation, I will turn to a very specific 
example set out in the “Timaeus” that concerns the process by which we come to experience 
vision.12 
 At 45b, Plato has Timaeus detail the process of vision.  Daylight, comprised of one of the 
four elements (fire), altered to merely provide a gentle light (as opposed to burning), is described 
as a “body” which comes into being freshly anew each day.  From and through the eyes exist a 
“pure” form of the element of fire, which, being related to the fire from which daylight is 
formed, becomes “one” with the fire from daylight whenever the stream of pure fire from the 
eyes hits an external object.  He goes on to say,  
“And because this body of fire has become uniform throughout and thus uniformly 
affected, it transmits the motions of whatever it comes in contact with as well as of 
whatever comes in contact with it, to and through the whole body until they reach the 
soul.  This brings about the sensation we call “seeing”” (Tim., 45b).13 
 
I want to make the case that by “soul” he is referring to the rational soul.  The first indication that 
this is what he means is that the mortal soul14 is only mentioned in passing and not even in name; 
rather Timaeus refers to it as “whatever else remained that the human soul still needed to have” 
(Tim., 42e), which is fashioned by inferior gods, offspring of the demiurge. At this point of the 
text, the only way in which “soul” is regarded is by its being referred to as the cosmic or world-
soul, the immortal, divine, intelligent soul of the universe instilled by the demiurge. The 
demiurge passes on the job of creating the human to his offspring after delivering to them 
inferior quality divine soul. It is important to note that the divine soul of the human is inferior 
                                                        
12 Going forward, all references are from Plato’s “Timaeus” from Plato: Complete Works (1997), 
1224- 1292, unless otherwise specified.  
 
13 My emphasis. 
 
14 Plato refers to the appetitive and spirited parts of soul as “mortal” or “lower” soul. 
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even before mortal soul is introduced. The inferiority is due to the demiurge using leftovers of 
the previous ingredients he had used to fashion the universe. And he considers this a good thing 
since pure grade divine soul would make the humans too god-like.15 In fact, there really is no 
explicit mention of the mortal soul until 70d and Timaeus emphasizes that these are added to the 
divine, immortal soul because it is “necessary”; namely, the human must be able to eat food, 
grow, perish, etc. 
The second indication that the “soul” to which the vision passage refers is the rational 
soul is given a few lines above the passage when Timaeus mentions that he is giving his account 
of vision in service of explaining why the gods fastened the eyes within the head. Earlier, he 
described the head as the “most divine part of us, and master of all our other parts” (Tim., 44e) 
and the face as the “soul’s vessel” (Tim., 45a). The head is the most divine part of the human 
since this is where the “divine orbits” are housed, i.e., the immortal origin of the soul handed to 
the gods by the demiurge.  In the creation of the head, the lesser gods most perfectly imitated the 
demiurge by “copying the revolving shape of the universe” (Tim., 44e).  In addition to this, all of 
the corporeal elements of the human that aids in acquiring virtue are fixed about the head such as 
the eyes (which observe the heavens), ears (which observe music and rhythm) and the mouth 
(which allows for speech).16   
 Furthermore, only a few lines after providing the mechanism for vision, Plato has 
Timaeus draw a distinction between auxiliary causes, which he specifies as the material elements 
that give rise to vision, and primary causes, which is attributed to “intelligent nature” and are the 
“actual causes” of phenomena and events.  He states,  
                                                        
15 The demiurge wanted to prevent any possibility of humans rivaling gods. 
 
16 For an account of seeing colors and hearing sounds, see 67b in “Timaeus”. 
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“[Auxiliary causes] are totally incapable of possessing any reason or understanding about 
anything.  We must pronounce the soul to be the only thing there is that properly 
possesses understanding.  . . [A]ny one who is a lover of understanding and knowledge 
must of necessity pursue as primary causes those that belong to intelligent nature, and as 
secondary all those belonging to things that are moved by others and that set still others 
in motion by necessity” (Tim., 46d-e).   
 
Clearly, the natural facts about the uniformity of fire between the fine fire of the eyes and the 
gentle fire in daylight causing motions throughout the body provide us with a secondary cause. 
But it is only when those motions “reach the soul” that we have discovered the primary cause of 
vision.  A similar case is made for the reason for vision and eyes and what Plato refers to as the 
“supremely beneficial reason” for vision and eyes.  The reason the gods designed eyesight in 
humans was to conduct light, subsequently providing them the ability to see things.  But this is 
only second to the actual reason for vision: vision is a gift from the gods that makes virtue 
possible for humans (and theoretically animals) to attain.  By observing the uniformity of the 
cosmos, humans develop the concepts of number and time, which lead humans into even more 
abstract pursuits, ultimately culminating in philosophy.17  
 However, one might object by arguing that the “soul” that appears in the vision passage 
might be the whole, complex soul and that the soul in its entirety is that which (primarily) causes 
vision. I do not think this approach can be successful, given the discussion immediately above.  
First of all, again, there is no mention of the mortal soul at this point of the text.  Second, and 
more to the point, it would be very odd for Plato to hold both that the entirety of the soul, is 
“something that shares [the gods’] name of ‘immortal,’ something described as divine and ruling                                                         
17 The full passage reads: “Let us rather declare that the cause and purpose of this supreme good 
is this:  the god invented sight and gave it to us so that we might observe the orbits of 
intelligence in the universe and apply them to the revolutions of our own understanding.  For 
there is a kinship between them, even though our revolutions are disturbed, whereas the universal 
orbits are undisturbed.  So once we have come to know them and to share in the ability to make 
correct calculations according to nature, we should stabilize the straying revolutions within 
ourselves by imitating the completely unstraying revolutions of the god” (Tim., 47b-c). 
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within those of them who always consent to follow after justice and after [the gods]” (Tim., 41d) 
given such a description perfectly tracks only descriptions of the rational part everywhere else in 
the text, including in the Republic, and that the mortal soul is marked by “unreasoning sense 
perception and all-venturing lust” (Tim., 1271).18 In fact, Timaeus stresses that “we must 
describe both types of causes [primary and secondary], distinguishing those which possess 
understanding and thus fashion what is beautiful and good, from those which, when deserted by 
intelligence, produce only haphazard and disorderly effects every time” (Tim., 46e). As is well 
known by now, the rational soul is the only part that can “fashion what is beautiful and good” 
and “possess[es] intelligence” and the mortal soul, when deserted by the rational part, produces 
disorder.  It follows that, the rational part is the actual cause of vision and is the soul to which the 
vision passage refers.19  
 Another serious objection to consider is that starting at 69b, Timaeus very explicitly goes 
on to describe the most accurate account of the coming to be of the world and its constituents as 
one in which intelligence and necessity are causally interwoven.  Timaeus first begins his 
account of the generation of the world by appealing only to intelligent cause or Intellect. He then 
begins again at 47e, acknowledging the existence of another kind of “straying cause,” which he 
identifies as Necessity. After acknowledging this cause, he recounts the creation of the universe 
from the perspective of Necessity. At 69b, it seems he begins his account anew with the 
                                                        
18 I will reintroduce the issue of unreasoning sense perception later in the paper. For present 
purposes, this passing mention will suffice. 
 
19 Note that earlier we mentioned the supreme, beneficial cause and reason for vision/ the 
possession of eyes was the possibility of attaining virtue and that this was made possible by the 
intelligence of the gods.  Given that rational soul is a diluted variant of the intelligence of the 
gods and is, in itself, the very thing that allows for the attainment of virtue, we could say that we 
are talking about the same thing. 
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realization that an account of how things come to be cannot be properly explained by appealing 
to either only Intelligence or Necessity. He addresses this earlier when he notes: 
“[This] ordered world is of mixed birth:  it is the offspring of a union of Necessity and 
Intellect.  Intellect prevailed over Necessity by persuading it to direct most of the things 
that come to be toward what is best, and the result of this subjugation of Necessity to 
wise persuasion was the initial formation of this universe” (Tim., 48a). 
 
Thus, under this objection, it might be misguided to locate causal agency within only intelligent 
centers of action or events since Intelligence and Necessity operate together as cooperating 
causes. 
 Nonetheless, this objection does not stand since, for Plato, seeking causal accounts is 
always somehow entrenched in moral cultivation and auxiliary causes always stand in second 
place to intelligent causes.  Searching for the cause of some action or phenomenon is simply the 
act of searching for the reason for that action or phenomenon and the reason for anything is 
ultimately rooted in intelligence.20  Intelligence operates with an end; hence, even when 
confronted with Necessity, Intellect must make use of it or make use of its results towards the 
end that it sees as best:  
“Although [the demiurge] did make use of the relevant auxiliary causes, if was he himself 
who gave their fair design to all that comes to be.  That is why we must distinguish two 
forms of cause, the divine and the necessary.  First, the divine, for which we must search 
in all things if we are to gain a life of happiness to the extent that our nature allows, and 
second, to the necessary, for which we must search for the sake of the divine. . . 
[Without] the necessary, those other objects, about which we are serious, cannot on their 
own be discerned, and hence cannot be comprehended or partaken of in any other way” 
(Tim., 69a). 
 
The project of seeking causes, according to this passage, is connected to the project of seeking 
virtue.  It is useful to identify auxiliary causes only insofar as they lead one to identify the 
                                                        
20 This sentiment is repeated in the “Philebus” when Socrates states that “reason belongs to that 
kind which is the cause of everything” (Phil., 30e).  See “Philebus” in Plato: Complete Works 
(1997), 398-456.  
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underlying primary, intelligent cause. This indicates that intelligent causes are, as Timaeus states 
in the first account of the generation of the world he provides, always the primary causes for any 
action or event.  Regardless of the effects of Necessity “setting things adrift,” anything endowed 
with intelligence is, in the first place, responsible for accommodating the conditions, which 
Necessity brings about.  In the sphere of moral actions, this leads to the contradictory result that 
when it comes to human beings, viciousness, even if it is the consequence of being born with a 
bad body,21 is both unintentional and self-imposed.  That is, while necessary or spontaneous 
factors can be discovered that explain certain actions or events, they fail to register as the “real” 
explanation if they are not rooted in the ultimate aims of the intelligent subject in question.  
Similarly, looking to auxiliary causes as explanations for phenomena in the world falls short of 
the reason why one should be searching for explanations. For instance, one should not study the 
heavens simply for the sake of formulating mathematical laws. Rather, such formulations should 
be seen as a step to moving beyond the studies of what is immanent towards something divine 
and for the sake of perfecting one’s soul. 
 Socrates also presents this account of real causation versus auxiliary causation in the 
“Phaedo”.  Socrates is interested in questions that are generally put forward in the context of 
natural science such as: “do we think with our blood, or air, or fire, or none of these and does the 
brain provide our senses of hearing and sight and smell, from which come memory and opinion, 
and from memory and opinion which has become stable, comes knowledge” (Phaedo, 96b) and 
“how men grew” (Phaed., 96c)?  He is initially attracted to the theory of causation he attributes 
to Anaxagoras because, according to what he has heard about the theory, “it is the Mind that 
directs and is the cause of everything” (Phaed., 97c).  Much like the account provided in the                                                         
21 Plato attributes viciousness to a lack in either of body or mind (or both). So, a poor bodily 
constitution might make a subject predisposed to viciousness. 
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Timaeus, intelligence is that which directs everything and it does so with the intention of 
arranging each thing according to what is best.  Seeking causes, then, consisted of learning what 
was the best and the worst way for a thing to be: 
“If then one wished to know the cause of each thing, why it comes to be or perishes or 
exists, one had to find what was the best way for it to be, or to be acted upon, or to act” 
(Phaed., 97c-d). 
 
And. like in the Timaeus, the investigation into only what is best (and worst) is connected to a 
moral project since once the best is specified for each thing as its cause and the general cause of 
everything that exists, next in the order of explanation is “the common good for all” (Phaed., 
98b, my emphasis).  Socrates, like Timaeus, also laments the failure of most philosophers to 
draw a distinction between “real,” intelligent causes and “that which the cause would not be able 
to act as a cause.”22 
In terms of the contradiction of viciousness or ignorance being both unintentional and 
self-imposed, a simple example might suffice in expressing Plato’s position.  When my cat 
jumps up on my desk and, in the process, kicks over my coffee mug, leading it to shatter on the 
floor, I can be seen as both the victim of an unfortunate accident and the person that is 
responsible for the breaking of the mug.  On the one hand, it is because of the cat’s movements 
and the mug being in a certain position on the desk and the result of porcelain hitting a very hard 
surface like my floor that the mug is broken. On the other hand, however, it is because of my 
choosing to place my mug right there on the desk and my neglecting to consider that my cat 
might jump onto my desk as he does every other day that the mug is broken.  It is this latter 
explanation that, for Plato, gives the best account for why it is that the mug is no longer intact.                                                           
22 “If someone said that without bones and sinews and all such things, I should not be able to do 
what I decided, he would be right, but surely to say that they are the cause of what I do, and not 
that I have chosen the best course, even though I act with my mind, is to speak very lazily and 
carelessly” (Tim., 99a-b).   
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 In a similar vein, the rational part is that which ultimately possesses causal power in the 
embodied, complex soul.  Surely one can attribute to the spirited and appetitive parts of the soul 
certain factors that bring about particular actions in the subject.  However, one would be 
mistaken to assume that this means there is causal agency at play equivalent to the way in which 
the rational part brings about actions in the subject.  Actual causes operate with the best end in 
sight and the mortal soul has no such teleological propensity. The rational soul is capable of  
making its aims comply with the good because it is derived from the world-soul. The world-soul 
is infused with intelligence and as such acts as an intermediary between the realm of Being and 
that of the sensible world.  Having access to the Ideal, world-soul maintains the order of the 
material universe as perfectly as Necessity allows. The rational soul, sharing in the world-soul’s 
capacity to order and arrange in accordance the good, consistently operates with this aim, though 
its sight of the end may be confused.  Still, the mortal soul is an interesting case given each 
irrational part does have its own aim, even if it is not intelligent: the spirited part seeks honor and 
the appetitive part seeks pleasure.  Despite this, the mortal soul cannot carry out its aims without 
the aid of the rational part, as I will argue shortly.   
In addition, although the mortal soul qualifies as soul-parts, it occupies a space 
somewhere in between Necessity and Intellect.  Plato does not spend much time discussing the 
ontological status of the mortal soul so it is unclear where among his classification of Being it 
stands. Nevertheless, it clearly comes onto the scene only when the human body is introduced 
and its ontological status must be derivative, even moreso than the human rational soul is 
derivative in comparison to the world-soul given the mortal soul is crafted by the lesser gods. 
The lesser gods merely imitate the demiurge; imitation, being an inferior practice, results in 
inferior products.  Moreover, the function of the mortal soul is to make the human being as much 
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like the cosmic body, the perfect material body, as possible.  Recall that the world is a “truly 
living thing, endowed with soul and intelligence.”  However, the world did not require an 
intermediary, mortal soul since it was not to experience any of the sensations.  Sensations are 
processes by which motions from external objects enter into and are processed by mechanisms 
internal to the body.  But there is nothing external to the world, hence there is no information it 
must process from without it (Tim., 33a-d).  Furthermore, the world does not require limbs since 
it occupies all space, thus there is no where to which it can move and it does not need to take 
anything into itself or relieve itself of anything since its waste and food self-contained in an 
endless loop.  As such, the world is perfect since it is “self-sufficient.”  The human body, on the 
other hand, is far from self-sufficient and requires all of the organs of sensations as well as 
appendages with which it can move about and acquire objects for its sustenance.  The mortal 
soul, then, is fitted to the body to accommodate its vast degree of imperfection and, as a result, 
initially exists to service the subject insofar as it is a body requiring nutrition to remain alive. In 
this capacity, as an extension of the body of sorts, the mortal soul functions similarly to auxiliary 
cause more so than it does to intelligent cause.  
In further defense of the position that the movements of the mortal soul function more so 
as auxiliary rather than intelligent causes is the fact that even if we wished to do away with them, 
the desires those motions produce always remain. In the Republic, Socrates asks, “what are we to 
suppose that the philosopher thinks of other pleasures compared with that of knowing the truth 
and being always engaged in the pursuit of it?  Won’t he rank them far lower, regarding them as 
necessary in the strict sense, things that he’d do without if they weren’t unavoidable?” (Rep. IX 
581e, my emphasis). Much like the material necessity Intellect is sometimes forced to deal with 
in its pursuit to order, movements inherent in the mortal soul force the subject to contend with 
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desires she would many times like to do without.  They are present necessarily since the mortal 
soul operates the way it does for the human being to physically thrive.  Thus, it seems best to 
relegate the mortal soul to the domain (or at least closer to the domain of) material, auxiliary 
causes.23 
 Thus far, I hope to have given sufficient support to convince the reader that only one part 
of the soul, the rational part, has any claim to actual causal power since it is the only part that is 
intelligent in nature.  This should begin to chip away at Brown’s assumption that Plato really 
meant something robust by agreement consisting in unity of “minded things” when referring to 
soul-parts.24  If mind implies intelligence, understanding, or the possibility of true action, then 
clearly we are minded only insofar as we possess rational souls.25  This should also begin to chip 
away at the two causal principles Brown proposes since his principles presuppose that the lower 
parts of the soul can affect the rational part as genuine causes.  If the rational soul is the only true 
cause that can be found within the human soul, then only the rational soul can affect other soul-
parts, and any decline of power it notices in its own part will be due to its own shortcomings in 
action.   
 Turning back to the “Timaeus”, we can further support this hunch and problematize 
Brown’s causal principles by investigating how exactly Plato deals with the interaction of soul-
                                                        
23 Also see Republic VI 493c5-6 in which Socrates calls out the Sophists for not making a 
distinction between necessary pleasures (for the maintenance of the body) and the true goods 
(wisdom).   
 
24 However, while this cannot hold (literally) for soul-parts, it does obtain between parts of the 
city since members of each class are, in fact, minded. 
 
25 This applies to animals as well.  According to Plato, animals theoretically possess minds since 
they contain a rational part to their soul.  However, animals fail to make use of their intelligence 
since they are burdened by not only their bodies, but an inferior quality of reason due to the past, 
vicious incarnation of their soul. 
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parts, specifically in the context of amplification or reduction of part-strength.  In discussing 
what it is for a human to lead a rational life, Plato has Timaeus detail (yet again) the three 
distinct souls that reside within the human, but this time he refers to them with respect to their 
motive forces. In keeping with the theme of the good, rational life versus the bad, ignorant life, 
Timaeus asserts, 
“Any type [of soul] which is idle and keeps its motions inactive cannot but become very 
weak, while one that keeps exercising becomes very strong . . . so we must keep watch to 
make sure that their motions remain proportionate to each other” (Tim., 89e-90a, my 
emphasis).  
 
The present narrative surrounding strong or weak souls is not so much a story about the causal 
interaction between soul-parts as much as it is about each soul- part remaining strong and, more 
importantly, each soul-part’s respective motion remaining proportionate to the other motions.  
The theme of proportion, which was central to Timaeus’ account concerning unification, returns. 
Keeping motions proportionate indicates a measuring act, which, for Plato, is an important task.  
Consider the following passage regarding measured agitations:  “it will happen that when a man 
subjects his body to these motions26 when it has been in a state of rest, the body is overcome and 
brought to ruin” (Tim., 88d).  However, if a man continually agitates his body and refuses to let it 
rest “he will keep in a state of natural equilibrium the internal and external motions.”  Then 
Timaeus adds “if the agitation is a measured one, he will succeed in bringing order and regularity 
to those disturbances and those elemental parts that wander all over the body according to their 
affinities in the way described in the account we gave earlier about the universe” (Tim., 88e). 
Remaining at rest makes motions idle while constant agitation makes equilibrium possible. But it 
is only when the agitation is measured, that order and regularity enter the picture. As the rational 
                                                        
26 Plato refers to the motions in the elements of the body produced by gymnastics or strenuous 
physical exercise. 
  26 
soul is that which calculates and measures, it follows that the rational soul is that which will 
establish the right amount of agitation to promote order. 
Furthermore, Plato has Timaeus provide this insight in the context of the “gravest disease 
of all”, or ignorance.  He gives an example of a large body (too much for its soul) joined to a 
puny, feeble mind.  Motions of the stronger part will predominate and amplify their own interest, 
thus “render[ing] the functions of the soul dull, stupid and forgetful” (Tim., 88b).  It seems 
completely sensible to ask what it means for a part to predominate and amplify its own interest. 
And it also seems sensible to ask why this amplification would render the function of the soul 
“dull, stupid and forgetful.”  Brown would offer his causal principles to answer these questions.  
I would like to return to an unlikely place- Plato’s account of vision- in order to make sense of 
my next move and begin to get my own account of unearned unity in the soul off of the ground.  
 Recall from the discussion surrounding vision my conclusion that the rational soul was 
the primary cause for vision.  While plenty of natural events take place between the material 
aspects of the human eye and the body of daylight external to the eye, these merely serve as 
auxiliary or secondary causes.  One way to further interpret this passage in my direction is to 
suppose that Plato means to say there exists no visual perception if reason is not involved.  My 
assumption is corroborated by another passage in which Plato seems to say that the rational soul 
is necessary for any sensation whatsoever, not just perceptive abilities like vision. At 64b, 
Timaeus makes the case that,  
“With every property, whether perceived or not, let us take up the question of causes of 
pleasure or pain in the following way, recalling the distinction made in the foregoing 
between what is easily moved and what is hard to move.  This is the way in which we 
must pursue all that we intend to comprehend.  When even a minor disturbance affects 
that which is easily moved by nature, the disturbance is passed on in a chain reaction with 
some parts affecting others in the same way as they were affected, until it reaches the 
center of consciousness and reports the property that produced the reaction” (Tim., 64b). 
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This passage mirrors that given about vision and recommends an interpretation that holds the 
rational soul as being that capacity in the human soul which cognizes or makes intelligible the 
motions of the other soul-parts.  That is, if a being is to have a mental life, it owes its mentality to 
the rational soul. Recall from earlier that the mortal soul was described as that which is “fused 
with unreasoning sense perception and all-venturing lust” (Tim., 1271).  Such a claim now makes 
sense with the present interpretation; that is, were the mortal soul to exist without the presence of 
the rational soul, the agent (if she can be called so) would fail to cognize the motions of the body 
that affect the motions of the mortal soul.  In other words, she would lack sense perception and 
the ability to experience pleasure and pain.  For example, Socrates explains to Protarchus in the 
Philebus that were a subject to completely lack all of the qualities one attributes to the rational 
soul (reason, memory, intelligence, etc.), and if such a subject were left only with the capacities 
of what is usually attributed to the sensitive soul, he would lack the capacity to feel pleasure or 
pain. One would simply be in ignorance about whether or not one were enjoying oneself, 
memories from one moment to the other would block the subject’s capacity to experience 
pleasure or pain, and one would not be in a position to calculate how to continue on in the 
pleasure (or avoid the pain) (Phil., 21b-d). Thus, while the lower soul accommodates the motions 
that will come in from the body, the higher, rational soul has its motions set off by the soul alone, 
whether that be the lower soul, fitted to the rational soul by the gods so that humans will eat, 
grow, perish, etc., or the divine, perfect, immortal soul present in the world-soul, the gods, and 
the demiurge.   
 On the face of it, this interpretation might not sit well with the very function of the mortal 
soul, which is to be the subject of passions and feelings.  That is, the mortal soul is the location 
in which passions and feelings arise and so my interpretation might be placing more weight on 
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the rational soul than is merited.  However, I do not think that I am overstating the causal role of 
the rational part in the process of sensations.  Without doubt, the mortal soul is the seat of all 
sensitive passions and feelings.  The rational soul, considered in itself, aims at attaining 
knowledge; thus, the objects of desire it seeks are of a wholly different variety than sensitive 
desires and that which it perceives is of a different variety than what the mortal soul perceives.  
In a certain sense, the rational soul- if it is to be successfully embodied and thrives as a human 
being- necessitates the presence of the mortal soul.  The human being cannot experience bodily 
sensations and pleasure or pain without the mortal soul. But sensations, pleasures and pains serve 
a particular function and without the participation of the rational soul, this function cannot be 
carried out.  These sensations serve the purpose of directing the human being to the maintenance 
of her existence as an embodied complex; mere brute “unreasoned” sensations cannot 
successfully fulfill this function.   
 Moving on, in favor of my reading is the account Plato describes of virtue in which a 
traumatized embodied, immortal soul regains its original motions.  The immortal soul is 
traumatized when it is fused with the body since the motions of the elements in the body contort 
the motions inherent in the divine orbits of the soul.  Disembodied, immortal souls enjoy 
synchrony with the divine orbits of the world-soul. Upon embodiment, however, the immortal 
soul’s orbits lose their alignment with the world-soul due to the violent and overbearing motions 
of body: “these orbits, now bound within a mighty river, neither mastered that river nor were 
mastered by it, but tossed it violently and were violently tossed by it” (Tim., 43a-b).  In the very 
next line, he describes the state of the human being fully intact with all of its soul-parts and 
body:  “consequently, the living thing as a whole did indeed move, but it would proceed in a 
disorderly, random and irrational way that involved all six of the motions (my emphasis)” and a 
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footnote clarifies Timaeus is describing the first movements of a new-born.  Notice that it must 
be the case that the mortal soul has been added to the immortal soul in order to permit the 
creation of the human being, but Timaeus is only explicitly referring to the effects of 
embodiment upon the rational soul.  It is explicit in that he calls the orbits those that belong to 
the “immortal soul.”  Of interest here, then, is why the soul is not intelligent at birth: “at this 
stage souls do not have a ruling orbit taking the lead. And so when certain sensations come in 
from outside and attack them, they sweep the soul’s entire vessel along with them. . . All these 
disturbances are no doubt the reason why even today and not only at the beginning, whenever a 
soul is bound within a mortal body, it at first lacks intelligence” (Tim., 44a-b).  Compared to all 
other periods in his lifetime, the human experiences exponential growth and development in his 
first few years so the “stream that brings growth and nourishment” is at its most turbulent during 
this time.  But as this phase subsides, “the soul’s orbits regain their composure, resume their 
proper courses, and establish themselves more and more with the passage of time, their 
revolutions are set straight. . . They then correctly identify what is the same and what is different, 
and render intelligent the person who possess them” (Tim., 44b-c).  But regaining the composure 
of the orbits requires nourishment.  
Timaeus supplies an account of proper nourishment of the soul much later in the text at 
90c-d during which he explains how the subject can set the rational soul’s revolutions straight. 
Proper nourishment is the only way to care for anything, which is just to ensure that its motions 
are proper to it:  
“We should redirect the revolutions in our heads that were thrown off course at our birth, 
by coming to learn the harmonies and revolutions of the universe, and so bring into 
conformity with its objects our faculty of understanding, as it was in its original 
condition.  And when this conformity is complete, we shall have achieved our goal:  that 
most excellent life offered to humankind by the gods, both now and forevermore” (Tim., 
90c).  
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The best way to tend to the soul is to “constantly care for [the] divine part,” which is to devote 
oneself to the love of learning and true wisdom (Tim., 90b).  In learning, we exercise rational 
part, thereby strengthening it and reestablishing its motions.  Drawing attention back to our 
earlier discussion about the measuring act of ensuring proportionate motions in each part of the 
soul, if we are to measure accurately and calculate perfectly, we will need a strong rational soul.  
The most important task an agent can undertake, then, is to secure the proper motions for her 
rational soul.   
 At this point, I would like to pull together all of the pieces in this section to show how 
they cohesively lend to an account of unearned unification.  According to my interpretation of 
Plato’s theory of vision, what makes a subject “minded” is her possession of the rational soul.  
The rational soul is responsible for the intelligence and agency of a subject as well as the 
possibility for her experiencing any type of sensation or perception.  This suggests that any and 
all psychological activity presupposes the involvement of the rational soul, which further 
suggests that the rational soul is always somehow overseeing the activity of the other soul-parts. 
In this way, the mortal soul is dependent on the immortal soul.  For instance, the rational soul 
might be said to “translate” the activity of the lower soul such that its activity manifests itself as 
a proper cognition to the subject. At birth, when the rational soul is first embodied, it is so 
overwhelmed by the nourishment needs of the new body that it is wholly invested in 
“translating” the motions of the lower soul, which is feeding the soul information from the body 
and external world.  Since the rational soul’s own motions are thrown off course by the violence 
in embodiment, it can only confusedly oversee the lower soul-parts by simply translating for 
them, which means the subject will act according to the “dictates” of the lower soul, though 
really it is acting according to the dictates of a confused, rational soul.   
  31 
 A similar story can be told regarding the ignorant person.  Timaeus generally refers to 
ignorance as a “disease” but he also describes it in a telling passage as the “cultivation of 
mortality.” A subject cultivates his mortality when he becomes “absorbed in his appetites and 
ambitions and takes great pains to further them.”  Timaeus labels such a person’s thoughts as 
“mortal.” He then contrasts this case with the subject who loves learning, calling the latter’s 
thoughts “immortal and divine.”  If we cast these claims within Timaeus’s comments on the 
strength or weakness of the soul-parts, we can say that in the case of the ignorant subject, the 
thoughts of the subject are “mortal” because the rational soul is overwhelmingly making 
intelligible the motions of the lower soul (in this case, the appetitive part), which is very similar 
to the case of the newborn. However, in the case of the newborn, the rational soul’s investment 
in making intelligible solely the motions of the lower soul is necessitated primarily by the 
rational soul’s inability to make intelligible that which is naturally intelligible (objects of true 
wisdom) due to its revolutions being forced off course, and secondarily by the urgent need of 
material resources to facilitate the growth of the human.  Notice that in such a state it would be 
inaccurate to suppose that the strength of the lower soul is causing the weakness of the rational 
part.  Rather, the rational part begins its embodied life in a frail state due to the violence of 
embodiment.  Once the forceful phase of nutrition and growth has passed over, however, the 
rational part can begin to more easily tend to the task of regaining its motions.  In fact, even the 
most uneducated people are still regarded intelligent to some extent given they possess language, 
can perform simple arithmetic, appreciate rhythm and music, and other such skills that qualify as 
rational endeavors, or activities to which the rational soul’s motions itself gives rise.   
However, such activities do not necessarily rouse the rational soul from its idleness, 
especially if the subject continues to preoccupy herself with “mortal” concerns.    If she never 
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fully commits herself to the study of the heavens, mathematics, music, and eventually 
philosophy, then the motions of her rational soul are never restored to their proper state, thereby 
leaving her rational soul in a weak state.  Again, it is not because of the lower, mortal soul that 
the rational soul remains weak; rather, the subject has performed little initiative to exercise the 
rational soul to make it strong. That is, the rational soul still oversees the lower soul but lacking 
wisdom, which can only be attained by restoring the motion of its orbits, it oversees the soul 
without any calibration with which it could then properly calculate or measure. Thus, the rational 
part is confusedly taking account of the lower soul-parts and, as such, of the whole soul because 
it lacks the knowledge necessary to direct each part such that the proportion of their motions are 
what is most advantageous for the subject as a whole. The rational soul’s organizing or directing 
capacity simply lacks calibration, as it is out of sync with its native, rational motions.  
Let us look at a case in which virtue is present in the subject to further flesh out this 
account.  In the virtuous subject, the rational part oversees the lower soul-parts but does so 
knowing which proportion of motions is best to bring about optimal functioning.  That is, since 
she has successfully restored the motion of her orbits in her rational soul, she can accurately 
measure or calculate what is advantageous for the soul as an entirety.  She is, as Timaeus 
describes it, constantly caring for her divine part and, in doing so, necessarily keeps the motions 
of the lower soul-parts in proportion.  However, by constantly tending to her “divine part,” Plato 
does not mean to suggest that she no longer cares for her body.  After all, the perfectly healthy 
person is proportionate in soul and body. The virtuous person cares for her body to the right 
degree, meaning she rationally beholds the function of her body and rationally assesses the 
material goods that will benefit her as a corporeal being.  Namely, the rational soul autocorrects 
the motions of the appetitive soul as it makes its motions intelligible.  In an ignorant subject, the 
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rational soul lacks true wisdom and therefore takes the objects translated from the motions of the 
appetitive soul at face value, thus translating the goods appetite wishes to attain as truly good and 
worth attaining.  The rational soul, lacking intelligence, can do no better than this in such 
situations. However, when the rational soul is operating properly, in sync with the motions of the 
heavens, it translates the motions of appetite in favor of what is truly good.  In a virtuous subject, 
the rational soul has secured its synchrony with the cosmic motions of the world-soul and all 
subsequent translations will lie in favor of what reason deems true and good.  Therefore, the 
virtuous subject is stable with regard to keeping the motions of her soul-parts in proportion and, 
as a result, experiences no struggle in the face of seeming temptation since reason will always 
translate motions in favor of reason.   
With my proposed account, the unearned unity of the soul-parts is not mysterious.  All 
three parts of the soul succeed as one, complex entity in virtue of the presence of the rational 
soul.  The rational soul alone makes possible the psychological aspect of each soul-part since, in 
overseeing the lower parts, the motions of each soul-part can be transformed into mental events 
apprehended by the subject.  The trajectory of the soul from unearned unity to earned unity, or 
virtue, tracks confusion to clarity; without knowledge, the rational soul confusedly oversees the 
lower soul-parts, confused because it knows not what is advantageous for its parts, thus 
cognizing the motions of each part without reason.  With knowledge, however, the rational soul 
clearly oversees lower soul-parts in that it knows precisely what is best for each part, thereby 
cognizing each soul-part in accordance with reason.   
Under this reading of unearned unification, the unity of consciousness also ceases to be 
mysterious.  Without the aid of the rational soul, the lower soul-parts simply fail to qualify as 
sources of psychological events.  The site of consciousness just is the rational soul and it is in the 
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rational soul’s activity of making intelligible the motions of the lower soul-parts that the subject 
comes to be conscious of his respective activities.  Hence, there is no need to seek a principle 
that unifies multiple sources of psychological events since there is already only one with which 
the complex soul begins.   
My final remaining task in this section is to address the issue of the rational soul’s moral 
responsibility of the complex soul’s embodied actions.  Recall that Brown’s solution to the 
problem was to assert that the soul-parts constitute something like a collective agency since the 
orderly causal structure of its parts tends toward agreement.  As a result, if one part of the soul 
brings about a particular action, the others are causally implicated (Brown 70).  Thus, even if the 
rational part is the only part that goes on in the afterlife, it fairly carries the burden of the 
complex soul’s embodied actions because “it could have been a more powerful obstacle.” 
My account provides a much more satisfying solution to this problem.  Recall that the 
only motions on which subjects have any direct impact are the motions that reside in the rational 
soul.  As humans mature, they can directly strengthen the rational soul by restoring its motions 
when they perform mathematics, astronomy, play music and ultimately study philosophy. The 
motions of the lower soul, on the other hand, are only indirectly impacted by the subject’s 
actions.  For instance, the appetitive soul becomes amplified only when the subject allows her 
rational soul to remain weak.  If the subject wishes to influence the motions of her lower soul, 
she can do so only by leaving her rational soul idle or by strengthening her rational soul such that 
it keeps in balance the motions of the soul-parts through a careful measuring act.  Any action of 
the agent is truly brought about by the rational soul, though that action might be brought about 
by confusion (when the rational soul is weak and thereby lacks intelligence, or it has not 
stabilized its measuring act to qualify as virtuous).  Any vicious action, then, is attributable only 
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to the rational soul since it is due to its weakness and subsequent confusion that the other parts of 
the soul have the occasion to “dominate.”  
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have argued that Plato understands the rational part to be the part in the 
embodied, human soul that warrants its fundamental unity prior to achieving virtue.  As I read 
him, Plato holds the cosmological function of reason to be the unification of its related material 
body and parts of that body by appealing to the Ideal and, in doing so, rendering order and 
harmony in the arrangement of its associated material body and those bodily parts. Since the 
cosmos serves as a model for the human being (in the Timaeus), the human rational soul 
similarly functions as a unifier. However, in the case of the human being, since a mortal soul is 
necessary, the rational soul primarily serves as that which unifies the distinct soul-parts.  Thus, 
the rational soul in the human being imitates the creative ordering act of the demiurge and it is 
only when the rational soul is successful in bringing the parts to the perfect, proportionate 
arrangement that is has succeeded in its “craft”- when it has reached a virtuous state.    
To generate this view, I argued against the account put forward by Brown in which he 
purports to show that the unification of the pre-virtuous soul is brought about by a casual 
structure inherent in the arrangement of the soul-parts.  Brown heavily relied on two causal 
principles, which I attempted to undermine by expounding Plato’s views on causation.  
According to Plato, true causes are attributed to Intellect. Thus, while unintelligent, necessary 
forces bring about certain events and phenomena, they are second in the order of explanation to 
intelligent forces that aim at good ends.  Such a position leaves Brown’s principles untenable 
since the intent of the rational soul and the forces of the lower soul cannot affect each other to 
the same extent.  Therefore, it is questionable as to what sort of “causal structure” is in place 
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within the complex, embodied soul and to what extent each part is “equally” accountable for 
actions of the subject. 
In addition, my view offers an explanation for the unity of consciousness.  Brown is not able to 
address this issue head on with his view, especially considering his concern that there is no easy 
way to account for shared content between the soul-parts.  My position simply proposes that the 
rational soul makes possible all cognition, including sensations, and is thereby the only site for 
consciousness. 
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